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Amorado: Domestic Violence Courts

“I PLEAD THE FIFTH”: NEW YORK’S INTEGRATED
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS AND THE DEFENDANT’S
FIFTH AMENDMENT DILEMMA
Rhona Mae Amorado*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Domestic violence is a problem that continues to baffle society today. In June 1994, the nation came face-to-face with the horrifying truth about domestic violence when news of the brutal murder of
Nicole Brown Simpson and subsequent arrest of football legend,
Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson, surfaced.1 Incidents of domestic violence have recurrently appeared in national news headlines since
then.2 Two decades later, the media was filled with news of the arrest
of then-National Football League player, Ray Rice, pertaining to a
domestic assault caught on camera.3 The effects of this unfortunate
incident rippled wide and, once again, society was forced to face the
uncomfortable topic of domestic violence.4 On February 2, 2016, an
*
J.D. Candidate 2018, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; M.S.W. Candidate
2018, Stony Brook University, School of Social Welfare; M.A. Forensic Psychology, John
Jay College of Criminal Justice; B.A. Psychology and B.S.E. Religious Education, De La
Salle University, Philippines. I would like to thank Dean Myra Berman for suggesting this
topic, connecting me to various resources and guiding me throughout this whole process.
Thank you to all the professionals who have given me a wealth of information. I would like
to particularly thank Judge Andrew A. Crecca, Presiding Judge of the Integrated Domestic
Violence Court, Suffolk County, for allowing me to interview him regarding IDV courts, as
well as the VIBS HALT Program clinical staff, who has taught me so much about domestic
violence and working with batterers. I further would like to thank Kristen Curley for her
advice, guidance, and patience during my editing process. Most importantly, I would like to
thank my family and my partner for their love, support, and encouragement.
1
Eric Malnic & David Ferrell, O.J. Simpson’s Ex-Wife Found Stabbed to Death, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (June 14, 1994), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-oj-simpsons-exwifefound-stabbed-to-death-story.html.
2
See generally DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK (3d ed.
2000) [hereinafter BERRY].
3
Childs Walker, One Year After Ray Rice Incident, Impacts Abound for Ravens, NFL,
Domestic-violence Activists, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.baltimore
sun.com/sports/bs-sp-ray-rice-one-year-20150214-story.html.
4
Id.
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estimated 5.11 million viewers tuned in to watch the first installment
of television network FX’s American Crime Story, The People v. O.J.
Simpson.5 Entertainment and news articles released a few days after
the show’s premiere suggest the continued significance and impact of
the O.J. murder trial and subsequent civil trial on issues about race,
gender, and more importantly, domestic violence.6
Domestic violence is not only a problem for celebrities or
public figures. In fact, domestic violence is a serious public health
concern.7 Anyone can become a victim,8 regardless of race, gender,
religion, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, or educational level.9 Domestic violence can be perpetrated in the form of physical,10
sexual,11 emotional,12 economic,13 or psychological14 abuse. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that approximately 74.7 million people in the United States have experienced
some form of domestic abuse in their lifetime.15 It is also estimated
5

Rick Kissell, 3-Day Ratings: “People v. O.J. Simpson” is Tuesday’s No.1 Show in Key
Demos, VARIETY (Feb. 16, 2016), http://variety.com/2016/tv/news/3-day-ratings-people-vso-j-simpson-fx-1201707564/.
6
Sarah Marshall, The People vs. O.J. Simpson Relives a Media Sensation, NEW REPUBLIC
(Jan. 31, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/128762/people-vs-oj-simpson-relives-mediasensation; Alyssa Rosenberg, Why America is Still Haunted by the O.J. Simpson Trial, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
act-four/wp/2016/02/02/americas-unfinished-business-from-the-o-j-simpson-trial/.
7
Linda L. Dhalberg & James A. Mercy, History of Violence as a Public Health Problem,
11 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 167 (2009).
8
The author acknowledges that there are male victims of domestic violence. However,
data show there are more female victims of domestic violence than male victims. For the
purposes of consistency, in this comment, the author refers to “victims” as females, and “batterers” as males. NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Domestic Violence
Statistics (2015), http://ncadv.org/files/National%20Statistics%20Domestic%20Violence%
20NCADV.pdf.
9
Id.
10
The 5 Forms of Domestic Violence, WOODBRIDGE TOWNSHIP D.V.R.T., http://www.
woodbridgedvrt.org/pages/fiveforms.html (last visited May 3, 2016) (describing physical
abuse as inflicting or attempting to inflict physical injury and/or illness; withholding access
to resources necessary to maintain health; and forcing alcohol and/or other drug use).
11
Id. (describing sexual abuse as coercing or attempting to coerce any sexual contact
without consent; and attempting to undermine a person’s sexuality).
12
Id. (describing emotional abuse as making or attempting to undermine a person’s selfworth).
13
Id. (describing economic abuse as making or attempting to make a person financially
dependent).
14
Id. (describing psychological abuse as instilling or attempting to instill fear; and isolating or attempting to isolate one from friends, family, school, and/or work).
15
National Intimate Partner & Sexual Violence Survey, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Nov. 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-
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that, in the United States, an average of twenty people per minute are
physically abused by their intimate partners.16 Scholars and lawmakers have been aware of these harrowing and growing statistics since
the feminist movement in the 1970s.17 Various studies, journals, and
articles have been written about victims of domestic violence – their
psychology, the short- and long-term effects of abuse, need for advocacy, and victims’ rights.18 However, little attention has been given
to the effects of domestic violence on batterers.19 Instead, most journals focus on the pathology of the abusers, the effectiveness, or lack
thereof, of Batterers Intervention Programs, and abusers’ efforts to
manipulate the legal system.20 The fundamental rights of domestic
batterers seem to take a back seat in the fight against domestic violence.
This comment focuses on the recently established specialized
courts in New York that attempt to address the complexities of domestic violence, the Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) courts.21
The main goals22 of IDV courts are to hold batterers accountable and
a.pdf (indicating that approximately 42.4 million women and 32.3 million men have experienced rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner at some point in their
lifetime).
16
NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Domestic Violence Statistics
(2015), http://ncadv.org/files/National%20Statistics%20Domestic%20Violence%20NCADV
.pdf.
17
Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvement on
an Effective Innovation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1290 (2000).
18
See generally MARY ROTHWELL DAVIS, DORCHEN A. LIEHOLDT & CHARLOTTE A.
WATSON (eds.), LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPRESENTING THE VICTIM (6th
ed. 2015) (stating that twenty-eight journals were dedicated to victims).
19
Id. (Only two journals were dedicated to offenders).
20
Id.
21
Integrated
Domestic
Violence
Courts,
CTR.
FOR
C T.
INNOVATION,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/project/integrated-domestic-violence-court (last visited May.
3, 2016) (New York established the first Integrated Domestic Violence courts in the Bronx,
Monroe, Onondaga, Rensselaer, Suffolk, and Westchester counties).
22
Amanda B. Cissner, Sarah Picard-Fritsche, & Nora Puffett, The Suffolk County Integrated Domestic Violence Court: Policies, Practices, and Implications, CTR. FOR CT.
INNOVATION 3 (Dec. 2011), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/
Suffolk_IDV.pdf [hereinafter Cissner, Suffolk IDV].
The goals of the Integrated Domestic Violence Courts are to promote:
1. Informed judicial decision-making by obtaining comprehensive and up-to-date
information on all issues involving the family;
2. Consistent handling of all matters relating to the same family by a single presiding judge;
3. Efficient use of court resources, with reduced numbers of appearances, and
speedier disposition due to greater availability of complete information;
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provide victims of domestic violence with justice and access to resources.23 IDV courts take various cases, such as matrimonial, civil,
and criminal cases in front of one judge.24 This ensures that the judge
is well informed about the entire situation and is able to provide consistent orders of protection.25 While the consolidation of cases addresses the practical societal concerns of the victims, it fails to consider the potentially improper ramifications for the defendants
involved in these cases.26
This comment argues that, while IDV courts purport to advance judicial efficiency, they neglect to consider possible infringements on the defendant’s constitutional rights. Specifically, this
comment will explore the constitutional dilemma created by the “one
judge-one family”27 system of IDV courts with regard to the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
This comment will be divided into four sections. Section II of
this comment will focus on the history of domestic violence in the
United States and New York. Section III will discuss the IDV courts
in general, as well as their constitutionality. Section IV will address
the possible violations of Fifth Amendment rights in IDV courts.
Specifically, it will argue that the defendant’s statements in his civil
or matrimonial proceeding can be used against him in his criminal
proceeding and vice-versa, potentially violating his privilege against
4. Concentration of social services and other resources to address the family
members’ needs comprehensively;
5. Victim safety, by eliminating conflicting orders and decisions that do not reflect domestic violence or child neglect histories;
6. Increased confidence in the court system by reducing inefficiencies for litigants
as well as opportunities for manipulation; and
7. Coordinate response and collaboration among criminal justice and child welfare agencies, community-based social services and domestic violence and
child victim advocacy groups.
Id. at 3-4.
23
Anat Maytal, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are they Worth the Trouble in
Massachusetts?, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 198 (Note) (2008).
24
Sarah Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspectives in an Integrated Domestic Violence Court:
The Case of Yonkers, New York, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION 1 (2011) [hereinafter PicardFritsche, Litigant Perspective].
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: Key Principles, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/IDV_FACT_SHEET.pdf (last
visited May. 3, 2016) (The “one family-one judge” model brings before a single judge the
multiple criminal, family, and matrimonial disputes for families where domestic violence is
an underlying issue).
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self-incrimination. It will also argue that participation in a Batterers
Intervention Program, where admission of abusive behavior is required, can potentially infringe on the defendant’s privilege against
self-incrimination. Section V will suggest two ways to resolve the
Fifth Amendment dilemma in IDV courts. First, it proposes that IDV
courts stay civil proceedings while criminal proceedings are ongoing.
Second, it proposes the use of judicial immunity for therapeutic confessions.
II.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

Historical Overview

Intimate partner violence, usually against women, has been
ingrained in society for centuries.28 The 499 B.C. Ancient Roman
law, Paterfamilias, for example, reads, “If you should discover your
wife in adultery, you may with impunity put her to death without a
trial, but if you should commit adultery or indecency, she must not
presume to lay a finger on you, nor does the law allow it.”29 This notion remained commonplace in society, with similar laws enduring
through the nineteenth century.30 Common law in the United States
provided that a husband could subject his wife to corporal punishment or “chastisement.”31 William Blackstone explained in his treatise on English common law that a husband could “give his wife
moderate correction.”32 Blackstone stated,
[f]or, as he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law
thought it reasonable to intrust him with the power of
restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same
moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children; for whom the master or parent is
also liable in some cases to answer . . . .33
28
BERRY, supra note 2, at 19 (stating that domestic violence has been reported in virtually
all societies, and in most countries, it has been both legally and socially acceptable).
29
Overview of Historical Laws that Supported Domestic Violence, WOMEN SAFE,
http://www.womensafe.net/home/index.php/domesticviolence/29-overview-of-historicallaws-that-supported-domestic-violence (last visited May 3, 2016).
30
Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, FAC.
SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, 2118 (1996).
31
Id.
32
Id. at 2123 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442).
33
Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430-33).
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The criminalization of domestic violence did not come until
the late 1800s.34 In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama rescinded
the legal right of husbands to beat their wives.35 In Fulgham v.
State,36 the defendant’s wife discovered him beating their children.37
The wife intervened and voiced her distress over the excessive punishment.38 The defendant turned the whip on his wife and struck her
twice on the back.39 The wife brought the case to court, asserting that
her husband did not have the right to chastise her.40 The case reached
the Alabama Supreme Court, which held that the “rule of love superseded the rule of force,” and the court denied the privilege of brutality against women.41 Since then, the public perception of domestic
violence slowly shifted from a private or personal matter to a public
health and policy concern.42
The intense media attention of the 1994 O.J. Simpson case
caused Americans to confront the issue of domestic violence on their
televisions and in their newspapers and magazines almost daily.43 Incidentally, domestic violence hotlines became flooded with numerous
phone calls.44 State legislators began taking the problem of domestic
violence more seriously.45 New York was quick to respond, enacting
the New York State Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994, in January 1995.46 While the case against O.J.
Simpson led to an acquittal, it was pivotal in achieving acknowledg34

Maytal, supra note 23, at 200.
Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871) (holding that “[A] rod which may be
drawn through the wedding ring is not now deemed necessary to teach the wife her duty and
subjection to the husband. The husband is therefore not justified or allowed by law to use
such a weapon, or any other, for her moderate correction. The wife is not to be considered
as the husband’s slave. And the privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat her with a stick,
to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her
like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law.”).
36
Id.
37
Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, FAC.
SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, 2118, 1234 (1996) (citing facts to Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143
(1871)).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Fulgham, 46 Ala. at 145.
41
Id. at 147.
42
Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 1.
43
MARGI LARID MCCUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 53-54 (1995).
44
Id. at 54.
45
Id.
46
Domestic
Violence,
NYCOURTS,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/familyviolence/dv/index.shtml (last visited May 3, 2016).
35

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/9

6

Amorado: Domestic Violence Courts

2016

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS

715

ment that domestic violence can happen anywhere and to anybody.47
The case brought up issues such as the danger women face after separation, the effects of domestic violence on children, and the need to
hold batterers accountable for their abuse.48
B.

New York

New York has been a frontrunner in the country’s fight
against domestic violence through its social reforms, legislation, and
subsequent creation of specialized domestic violence courts.49 In
June 2012, the New York State Senate passed legislation that enhances victim protection and increases criminal penalties for abusers.50 New York defines domestic violence as “[a] pattern of coercive tactics, which can include physical, psychological, sexual,
economic and emotional abuse perpetrated by one person against an
adult intimate partner with the goal of establishing and maintaining
power and control over the victim.”51
Domestic violence is a complicated matter to confront, particularly because it involves various family dynamics that affect each
involved individual differently.52 While batterers find themselves involved in the legal system, victims of abuse suffer physical and mental problems as a result of domestic violence.53 It is not uncommon
for women to lose their jobs, if they even had any, because of absenteeism due to illness as a result of the violence.54 Many women must
move away from their homes, seek safety in a shelter, or find themselves homeless, all to avoid violence.55 These women may lose family and friends as a result of battering.56 Many women have to forgo
47

BERRY, supra note 2, at 55.
BERRY, supra note 2, at 55.
49
Suzane Cecala & Mary M. Walsh, New York State’s Response to Domestic Violence,
OFFICE OF THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 4 (2006), http://opdv.ny.gov/whatisdv/
about_dv/nyresponse/nysdv.pdf.
50
2012 New York State Domestic Violence and Related Laws, OFFICE OF THE PREVENTION
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.opdv.ny.gov/law/summ_year/sum12.html (last visited
May 3, 2016).
51
The Law - Domestic Violence, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/topics/
domesticViolence.shtml (last visited May 3, 2016).
52
BERRY, supra note 2, at 29.
53
BERRY, supra note 2, at 29
54
BERRY, supra note 2, at 93
55
BERRY, supra note 2, at 96.
56
BERRY, supra note 2, at 39.
48
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financial security during a divorce to avoid further abuse.57 For victims with children, the emotional and financial struggles are exacerbated.58 In fact, children who witness domestic violence, or who may
have been abused, demonstrate significant behavioral and emotional
problems59 and often require treatment and additional services on
their own.60 In order to address this complexity more efficiently,
New York created a specialized criminal part dedicated to addressing
domestic violence issues.61 Currently, there are over thirty-nine domestic violence parts.62 Each of these parts have specialized features,
including a courtroom dedicated exclusively to the handling of domestic violence cases with a single presiding judge, a fixed prosecutorial team, court staff who receive special training in domestic violence issues, innovative computer technology to aid in monitoring
defendants, a specialized domestic violence probation program, and
extensive services for victims.63
Families who are affected by domestic violence also require a
variety of legal services.64 Orders of Protection65 may either be obtained in family court, matrimonial court, or issued by a judge in
criminal court.66 Victims may have to go to family court in order to
address custody and visitation arrangements if the parties have children.67 Victims may also find themselves in matrimonial court

57

BERRY, supra note 2, at 94.
BERRY, supra note 2, at 129.
59
BERRY, supra note 2, at 129
60
BERRY, supra note 2, at 129
61
Domestic
Violence,
NYCOURTS,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/familyviolence/dv/index.shtml (last visited May 3, 2016).
62
Id.
63
Robert V. Wolf, Liberty Aldrich, & Samantha Moore, Planning a Domestic Violence
Court, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 1 (2004) [hereinafter Wolf, Planning DV Court].
64
See generally Melissa Labriola, et al., A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts,
CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION (2010).
65
Obtaining an Order of Protection, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/faq/
orderOfProtection.shtml#q1 (last visited May 3, 2016). (“An order of protection is issued by
the court to limit the behavior of someone who harms or threatens to harm another person. It
is used to address various types of safety issues, including, but not limited to stipulations involving domestic violence. Family courts, criminal courts, and Supreme Courts can all issue
orders of protection. An order of protection may direct the offending person not to injure,
threaten or harass you, your family, or any other person(s) listed in the order. It may include, but is not limited to, directing him/her to stay away from you and your children, move
out of your home, follow custody orders, pay child support, not have a gun.”).
66
Id.
67
See BERRY, supra note 2, at 155.
58
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should they or their partners file for divorce.68 It is common to find
one family unit involved in at least two or more cases simultaneously.69 Prior to 2000, parties in a domestic violence dispute in New
York found themselves dealing with various judges in various
courts.70 Parties involved in cases of domestic violence were often
simultaneously involved in related cases in family, criminal, and/or
matrimonial matters71 in the New York State Supreme Court.72 This
fragmentation made it difficult for victims to maneuver the court system.73 In addition, it is possible for the family court and criminal
court to issue conflicting orders of protection against the batterer.74
In an effort to address these issues, New York established the IDV
courts75 in 2001.76 IDV courts are Problem-Solving Courts,77 which
68

See BERRY, supra note 2, at 155
Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 1.
70
Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 1.
71
Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 1.
72
This comment will refer to the New York State Supreme Court as “Supreme Court.”
Where the supreme court of another state is concerned, this comment will specify.
73
Wolf, Planning DV Court, supra note 63, at 1.
74
Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 2.
75
22 NYCRR § 41.1, entitled “Integrated Domestic Violence Parts of Supreme Court and
Domestic Violence Parts of Superior Courts,” states:
(a) Integrated Domestic Violence Parts of the Supreme Court and Domestic Violence Parts of the Supreme or County Court may be established in one or more counties by order of the Chief Administrator of the
Courts following consultation with and agreement of the Presiding Justice of the Judicial Department in which the affected county or counties
are located. As provided by the rule of the Chief Administrator promulgated pursuant to subdivision (b) of this section:
(1) Integrated Domestic Violence Parts shall be devoted to hearing and
determination, in a single forum, of cases that are simultaneously pending in the courts if one of them is a domestic violence case in a criminal
court and the other is a case in Supreme or Family Court that involves a
party or witness in the domestic violence case; or if one is a case in criminal court, Family Court or Supreme Court and the other is a case in any
other courts having a common party or in which a disposition may affect
the interests of a party to the first case. The Chief Administrator also
may provide that, where cases are disposed of in an Integrated Domestic
Violence Part, subsequent cases that would have been eligible for disposition in such Part were they to have been pending simultaneously with
the cases already disposed of shall be eligible for disposition therein.
Where no Domestic Violence Part has been established in the county
pursuant to rules of the Chief Administrator promulgated pursuant to
subdivision (b) of this section, the Chief Administrator may also provide
that domestic violence cases pending in a criminal court in the county
shall be eligible for disposition in the Integrated Domestic Violence Part
if necessary to best utilize available court and community resources for
69
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aim to improve the New York courts’ effectiveness in meeting the
needs of families involved in several cases.78
III.

INTEGRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS

New York State currently has forty-two IDV courts.79 IDV
courts handle all related cases of a single family where the underlying
issue is domestic violence.80 These related cases include, but are not
limited to, criminal cases, child abuse and neglect cases, custody and
visitation cases, and divorce cases.81 This type of integrated court
addresses the complicated trial court structure of New York.82 In
New York, divorce cases are handled in the matrimonial branch of
the Supreme Court; allegations of criminal domestic violence and
child abuse are prosecuted in any of the several criminal courts, including the Domestic Violence parts; and tort claims, custody, visitation, and other family matters are resolved in family court.83 However, these different courts all have concurrent jurisdiction over

domestic violence cases.
2) Domestic Violence Parts shall be devoted to the hearing and determination of domestic violence cases pending in criminal court in the county
if necessary to best utilize available court and community resources for
domestic violence cases.
(b) The Chief Administrator shall promulgate rules to regulate operation
of Integrated Domestic Violence Parts in Supreme Court and Domestic
Violence Parts in Supreme and County Courts. The rules of the Integrated Domestic Violence Parts shall permit a justice of the Supreme
Court to transfer to such court, for disposition in an Integrated Domestic
Violence Part thereof, any eligible case pending in another court in the
same county. The rules of the Domestic Violence Parts shall permit a
justice of the Supreme Court or a judge of the County Court to transfer
to such court, for disposition in a Domestic Violence Part thereof, any eligible case pending another criminal court in the same county.
76
Integrated
Domestic
Violence
Court,
CTR.
FOR
C T.
INNOVATION,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/project/integrated-domestic-violence-court (last visited May
3, 2016).
77
See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
78
Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 1, 2.
79
Domestic
Violence,
NYCOURTS,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/familyviolence/dv/index.shtml (last visited May 3, 2016).
80
Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 1, 2.
81
Domestic
Violence,
NYCOURTS,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/familyviolence/dv/index.shtml (last visited May 3, 2016).
82
Id.
83
Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 1.
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issuance of Orders of Protection.84 This means that victims of domestic violence may obtain an order of protection at any and all of
these courts.85 This fragmented system, combined with the complications inherent in domestic violence dispute, result in conflicting court
orders, repeated interviews with parties, unnecessary delays, multiple
court appearances, and other complications.86
A.

Transfer of Case to IDV Courts

Unlike other Problem-Solving courts, defendants cannot elect
to opt-in or opt-out of IDV courts.87 In IDV courts, a project director
reviews cases from a database to find any cases that are open in both
criminal court and family or matrimonial court.88 These cases are
then presented to the judge and reviewed to be determined whether
they meet the criteria for transfer to IDV courts.89 In New York, Part
141 of the Rules of the Chief Judge defines an IDV eligible case as “a
domestic violence case commenced in a criminal court and a case
commenced in Supreme or Family Court that involves a party or witness in the domestic violence case . . .” simultaneously pending in the
county.90 The criminal allegation of domestic violence forms the
threshold requirement for entry into the IDV courts.91
Once it is determined that a case is appropriate, the IDV judge
issues a formal transfer request of the various cases to the IDV
courts.92 The case is then placed on the IDV judge’s calendar, and
the judge reviews the pretrial status of the defendant.93 In reviewing
84

Obtaining an Order of Protection, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/faq/
orderOfProtection.shtml#q1 (last visited May 3, 2016).
85
Id.
86
Integrated
Domestic
Violence
Court,
CTR.
FOR
C T.
INNOVATION,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/project/integrated-domestic-violence-court (last visited May
3, 2016).
87
Domestic
Violence,
NYCOURTS,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/familyviolence/dv/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
88
Daniel D. Angiolillo, The Integrated Domestic Violence Court: New York’s Successful
Experience, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM 152
(Mary Rothwell Davis, et al., (eds.) 6th ed., 2015) [hereinafter Angiolillo, IDV Court].
89
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88.
90
22 NYCRR § 141.1(b).
91
NYCOURTS, NEW YORK STATE PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS (2015).
92
IDV Frequently Asked Questions, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
10jd/suffolk/IDV/IDVQuestions.shtml#faqfunction (last visited May 3, 2016) [hereinafter
Frequently Asked Questions].
93
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 92.
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the pre-trial status of the defendant, the judge makes sure that there is
an order of protection in place, and the defendants who are not held
pending trial are enrolled in, or referred to, a Batterers Intervention
Program.94 Cases that are transferred to IDV courts are not consolidated, but proceed according to the substantive and procedural law of
the originating court.95 Each case is assigned a new docket number,
and heard separately during one court appearance.96 Although integrating various cases under one court provides efficiency for all parties involved, questions have been raised as to the constitutionality of
these court transfers.
B.

Constitutionality

The constitutionality of the IDV courts was questioned for the
first time in People v. Fernandez.97 In this case, Fernandez was accused of threatening and harassing his former paramour on several
occasions over the phone.98 Fernandez was subsequently charged
with aggravated harassment in the second degree based on his actions.99 Thereafter, a court ordered Fernandez’s case to be transferred
to the IDV Part of the Supreme Court of Kings County, where he was
convicted of the charges against him.100 The main issue on appeal
was whether, under the New York State Constitution, the IDV part of
the Supreme Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear misdemeanor charges without a grand jury indictment or a superior court
information.101
In its analysis, the court looked to the language of the New
York Constitution, which states that the Supreme Court has the pow-

94
EDWARD W. GONDOLF, BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEMS, 9-13 (2001). Batterers intervention programs are an innovative effort of the American social service system to address the growing problem of domestic violence in the country. These programs generally
consist of weekly group counseling sessions for men and women arrested for assaulting their
partners. These programs employ various theoretical frameworks, such as psychoeducational, psychodynamic, and the Duluth model. Id.
95
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 92.
96
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 92.
97
897 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010) (stating that the principal issue presented
on this appeal was a first impression for this court).
98
Id. at 160.
99
Id. at 161.
100
Id.
101
Id.
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er to adjudicate all causes of action, including misdemeanors.102 The
court then discussed the constitutionality of IDV parts, and stated that
the constitution authorized removal of misdemeanor cases to the IDV
parts of the Supreme Court.103 Nevertheless, Fernandez argued that
the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over his case because he
had not been indicted by a grand jury, nor had the district attorney
filed a written accusation against him in a superior court, as required
under CPL § 210.05.104 The court rejected this argument holding that
“CPL 210.05 merely prescribes the method and manner required for a
prosecutor to prosecute an offense . . . it was not intended to prohibit
the Supreme Court from exercising its jurisdiction under the New
York State Constitution, nor can it.”105 The court, therefore, affirmed
the trial court’s judgment against Fernandez.106
This case established that an IDV court, as a Supreme Court,
is not constitutionally limited in the cases that it may hear. Further, it
established that IDV courts may order the removal and transfer of
criminal and civil cases to their jurisdiction. However, the transfer of
these cases, which has varying procedural and substantive laws, under one court creates a constitutional problem for the defendants in
these proceedings. Specifically, this integration raises a potential for
a violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.
IV.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND IDV COURTS

The origin of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution is the English common law.107 The English courts initially
relied on the Latin maxim, nemo teneture seipsum prodere – “no man
is bound to accuse himself” – to protect the accused from unjust
methods of interrogation.108 In the eighteenth century, the English
courts established the privilege against self-incrimination as a funda-

102

People v. Fernandez, 897 N.Y.S.2d at 162 (citing N.Y. CONST., art. VI § 7(a)).
Id. at 163, 164.
104
Id. at 165 (citing CPL § 210.05, which provides, “The only methods of prosecuting an
offense in a superior court are by an indictment filed therewith by a grand jury or by a superior court information filed therewith by a district attorney”).
105
Id. at 166.
106
Id. at 167.
107
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 368 (1968).
108
Id. at 3.
103
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mental right of criminal defendants.109 This was adopted by the
American courts, and in 1789, was added to the Bill of Rights.110
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”111
The privilege against self-incrimination applies to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment.112 New York State has adopted the language
of the Fifth Amendment, providing, for the most part, similar protections under this clause.113 The privilege against self-incrimination is
not limited to criminal cases.114 The United States Supreme Court
has held that this fundamental right applies to both criminal and civil
proceedings.115 In the United States Supreme Court case, Leftkowitz
v. Turley,116 the court held that:
The Amendment not only protects the individual
against being involuntarily called as a witness against
himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges
him not to answer official questions put to him in any
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
where the answers might incriminate him in future
criminal proceedings.117
The privilege against self-incrimination, therefore, guarantees
every person the right to remain silent when there is real and substantial risk of incrimination.118 This constitutional privilege also protects
against any communication that links “a chain of evidence” that
109

STEVEN SALKY & PAUL B. HYNES, THE PRIVILEGE OF SILENCE 2 (2d ed.) (2009).
Id. at 2, 3.
111
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
112
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that “the Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against abridgement by the States).
113
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (stating in relevant part that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself . . .”).
114
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (stating “The privilege is not ordinarily
dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be
used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, whenever the answer might tend to
subject criminal responsibility him who gives it”).
115
Id.
116
414 U.S. 70 (1973).
117
Id. at 77.
118
Jessica Wilen Berg, Give me Liberty or Give me Silence: Taking a Stand on Fifth
Amendment Implications for Court-Ordered Therapy Programs, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 700,
796 (1994) [hereinafter Berg, Liberty or Silence] (citing Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87,
98 (1969)).
110
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could be used for further prosecution.119 In Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission of New York Harbor,120 Justice Goldberg discussed the
values and purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.121 He
stated:
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most
noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses;. . . .122
The courts realized that, while the privilege functions as a “shelter to
the guilty,” it often provides “protection to the innocent.”123 The values and purpose of the Fifth Amendment have expanded over the
years. More recently, this privilege against self-incrimination has
been viewed as providing individuals with their “most treasured protections – preservation of our autonomy, privacy, and dignity against
the threat of state coercion.”124
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies
when a communication is “testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.”125 First, the United States Supreme Court defines testimonial
communications as spoken words or actions, whether explicit or implicit, that reveal one’s thoughts, beliefs, or knowledge.126 Second, a
communication is compelled when, by an action of the government
or a body of authority, one makes a statement under undue influence,
force or coercion.127 Lastly, a communication is incriminating when
a person’s testimony creates a real and ascertainable risk of exposing
119

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 2122 (2001) (per curiam).
120
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
121
Id.
122
Id. at 55.
123
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1995).
124
State v. Reyes, 2 P.3d 725, 733 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000).
125
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial, 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004).
126
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35, 42-43 (2000); Doe v. United States, 487
U.S. 201, 209-11 (1988).
127
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187-88, 190 (1977) (stating that the test for
compulsion “is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the
witness was overborne” Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).
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himself to future criminal charges.128 This constitutional privilege,
however, is not automatic.129 Therefore, a defendant must expressly
assert his Fifth Amendment right; otherwise, it is waived.130
There are, however, two situations where the privilege against
self-incrimination is self-executing.131 The first situation involves
custodial interrogations.132 This situation usually arises when an individual is being interrogated while in police custody.133 The second
situation where the privilege against self-incrimination is selfexecuting involves penalty cases.134 The United States Supreme
Court has held that an individual’s Fifth Amendment privilege is violated when the “State not only compel[s] an individual to appear and
testify but also [seeks] to induce him to forgo [his] Fifth Amendment
privilege by threats to impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable
of forcing self-incrimination.’ ”135 This is particularly evident in cases where defendants are punished for invoking their Fifth Amendment right and choosing to remain silent.136
Defendants in IDV courts find themselves in concurrent proceedings where a judge has access to all their information from their
criminal, family and matrimonial cases.137 This situation creates a
risk that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination will be violated because each case is usually heard in
128

Id. at 765-69.
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1984).
130
Id.
131
Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 712-13.
132
Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 712.
133
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-30 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
134
Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 713.
135
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806
(1977)).
136
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 52-53 (1968) (“Substantial hazards of incrimination as to past or present acts plainly may stem from the requirements to register and to
pay the occupational tax. In the first place, satisfaction of those requirements increases the
likelihood that any past or present gambling offenses will be discovered and successfully
prosecuted. It both centers attention upon the registrant as a gambler, and compels “injurious disclosure[s]” which may provide or assist in the collection of evidence admissible in a
prosecution of past or present offenses. These offenses need not include actual gambling;
they might involve only the custody or transportation of gambling paraphernalia, or other
preparations for future gambling. Further, the acquisition of a federal gambling tax stamp,
requiring as it does the declaration of a present intent to commence gambling activities,
obliges even a prospective gambler to accuse himself of conspiracy to violate either state
gambling prohibitions, or federal laws forbidding the use of interstate facilities for gambling
purposes”).
137
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151-52.
129
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one day, one after the other.138 Furthermore, defendants in IDV
courts usually find themselves mandated to Batterers Intervention
Programs as part of their plea agreements or conditions of bail.139
Section A will discuss the concurrent proceedings in IDV courts and
their implications for the IDV defendant. It will demonstrate that
statements made by defendants during these concurrent proceedings
would most likely satisfy the three elements required to establish that
a Fifth Amendment right exists.140 Section B will discuss the treatment mandates imposed in IDV courts and how treatment confessions likely fall under Fifth Amendment penalty cases.141
A.

Concurrent Civil-Criminal Proceedings

Courts that combine civil and criminal cases, such as IDV
courts, increase the possibility that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment
right would be violated because the statements that he makes in these
proceedings are likely testimonial, coerced, and incriminating.142 The
Supreme Court in United States v. Ward143 stated, “[T]he distinction
between civil penalty and criminal penalty is of some constitutional
import.”144 Criminal and civil courts have different practices, procedures, and burdens of proof.145 However, the essential difference between these courts is their purpose.146 The goal of civil court is to
correct a legal wrong by awarding monetary or equitable relief to the
plaintiff.147 The purpose of criminal courts, on the other hand, is to
138

Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 92.
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153.
140
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
141
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
142
See Ex parte Rawls, 953 So.2d 374, 387 (2006) (stating “The civil divorce proceeding
and the criminal proceeding based on the stalking charge are parallel proceedings, and Bryan’s Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in the criminal proceeding is
threatened if the divorce proceeding is not stayed”); Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578, 581
(5th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that “[F]ifth [A]mendment issues frequently arise when parallel
criminal, civil or administrative proceedings are pending”).
143
448 U.S. 242 (1980).
144
Id. at 248.
145
Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1352 (1991) (civil courts have a preponderance of the evidence burden
of proof, while criminal cases have a clear and convincing standard, a much higher burden of
proof).
146
Id.
147
Id.
139
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protect society by punishing the defendant.148 While there is an arsenal of civil remedies, there are more fundamental rights afforded to a
criminal defendant because of the severity of punishment he would
face should he be found guilty.149
Although the privilege against self-incrimination provides
broad protections, it is not absolute particularly in civil cases.150 This
becomes a problem for defendants who find themselves in IDV
courts where one judge hears these simultaneous proceedings. The
factual overlap between these cases creates a particular risk for the
defendants in that their statements in one proceeding may be used
against them in another.151 A survey conducted by the Battered
Women’s Justice Project on specialized criminal domestic violence
courts suggested that combined civil and criminal jurisdiction may
inappropriately encourage judges and prosecutors to focus on facts
that should not influence their decisions in criminal cases.152
A study conducted by the Center for Court Innovation regarding the litigant’s perspective of IDV courts revealed that only 44% of
defendants felt that their cases were treated fairly.153 In addition,
over 75% of defendants reported being unhappy with the judge’s decision in their family court case.154 Their satisfaction with their case
outcomes was significantly related to whether they viewed the IDV
courts process as fair or not.155 What is most concerning is that 80%
148

Id.
See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991).
150
See Mertsching v. United States, 704 F.2d 505, 507 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that privilege against self-incrimination does not shield tax preparer from giving testimony because
penalties are civil in nature); Attor v. Attor, 894 A.2d 83, 92-93 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2006) (holding that trial court erred when it allowed the wife to assert her Fifth Amendment
privilege because statutes of limitations had run and her fear of deportation was only a civil
hardship).
151
Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 18.
152
Julie A. Helling, Specialized Criminal Domestic Violence Courts, BATTERED WOMEN'S
JUSTICE PROJECT 6 (1999), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/specialized_criminal
_domestic_violence_courts.pdf (stating that victims sometimes ask the prosecutor to dismiss
or reduce the charges of the defendant because the victim feared that the defendant would
not pay child or spousal support. Judges have also asked prosecutors to dismiss a criminal
charge after having granted an Order of Protection against the defendant).
153
Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 13.
154
Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 18 (noting that 69% “of both
victims and defendants reported that they got very little or none of what they wanted” from
their family case outcome).
155
Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 18.
149
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of both victims and defendants felt the judge used information from
their criminal case in making decisions about their family court case,
or vice-versa.156 These results show that having the criminal, family
and matrimonial cases under one court to be heard in front of one
judge potentially violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
1.

Dilemma in Concurrent Proceedings

The one family-one judge structure of IDV courts can blur the
procedural differences between criminal and civil courts thereby increasing the chance that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right would
be violated.157 Although each case in the IDV courts retains its own
docket, the fact that one judge hears each case in one day, beginning
with the criminal case, places the defendant in a problematic position
of whether to remain silent and suffer the consequences, or waive his
Fifth Amendment right and suffer possible consequences of this confession.158
Havell v. Islam159 highlights the differences among civil, matrimonial and criminal cases, and it also illustrates the dangers had
these cases been integrated under one court.160 In Havell, the parties
were involved in concurrent matrimonial and criminal cases.161 The
parties were married for twenty-one years with six children.162 On
April 15, 1999, the plaintiff allegedly informed the defendant that she
wanted a divorce.163 On the morning of April 22, 1999, the defendant
repeatedly struck the plaintiff’s face and head with a barbell, severely
injuring her.164 The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged
for second degree attempted murder and first degree assault.165 Sub156

Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 19.
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151-52 (stating that the judge in IDV courts
must maintain objectivity because he presides over both family and criminal cases of one
family, and “is in possession of the pertinent information on the related cases”).
158
Cf. Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990)
(where defendant had to choose between producing her child and possibly being incarcerated
or asserting her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and be in contempt of court).
159
718 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
160
Id.
161
Id. at 808.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Havell, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
165
Id.
157
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sequently, the plaintiff filed a divorce action against the defendant.166
A month later, the defendant was alleged to have violated the terms
of his temporary order of protection when he went into the marital
residence with his attorney to remove personal property.167
The defendant requested a stay for his contempt case.168 He
argued that the concurrent criminal cases, one arising from his attempted murder charge and the other from a violation of an order of
protection, would open him to a risk of self-incrimination.169 Specifically, the defendant argued that testifying about his violation could
lead to inferences about his state of mind, which could be used
against him in his pending attempted murder case.170 In deciding
whether to grant such stay, the court looked to the factors used by
federal courts.171 Finding that several factors applied in this case, the
trial court stayed the criminal contempt proceeding for six months.172
In the divorce action, the defendant filed a motion to preclude
the plaintiff’s offering any evidence concerning his conduct during
marriage.173 The trial court, however, denied the defendant’s motion,
which the Appellate Division affirmed.174 The court reasoned that
while conduct is generally not considered in determining equitable
distribution, there are exceptions to this rule.175 Specific to this case
was the catchall provision, which includes “misconduct that ‘shocks
the conscience’ of the court.”176 Having found that the defendant’s
conduct falls under this exception, which had been substantiated by
several witnesses, the court held that the trial court did not err in considering the defendant’s abusive behaviors toward his wife in determining equitable distribution.177
This case demonstrates the complexity of domestic violence
cases, and how these cases are usually ongoing. This also shows the
166

Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449, 449 (1st Dep't 2002).
Id. at 451.
168
MELISSA L. BERGER ET AL., NEW YORK LAW OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2014) (citing
Havell, 718 N.Y.S.2d 807).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Havell, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
174
Id. at 451, 455.
175
Id. at 452.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 452-55.
167
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possible dilemma that defendants face when there are concurrent proceedings similar to those in IDV courts. Often, a defendant would
have to choose between testifying and risking that his statements
would be used against him at a later proceeding or asserting his privilege against self-incrimination and risking other consequences of his
silence.
2.

Implications for the IDV Defendants

The construction of IDV courts, where one judge hears all the
cases of one family, creates unique issues for the defendants, including having to choose between asserting their Fifth Amendment right
and risking the consequences of their silence.178 Defendants are held
to a great degree of accountability in IDV courts because of their frequent interaction with the judge.179 The judge probes the defendant
about his life and compliance with court mandates, such as orders of
protection and participation in Batterers Intervention treatment.180
Judges, prosecutors, caseworkers, probation officers, treatment providers, and sometimes, defense attorneys also meet beforehand to
discuss the defendant’s progress, or lack thereof, in treatment.181
In Suffolk County, New York, all of these participants
streamline the court process by sharing information with each other.182 Prosecutors, although not involved in the defendant’s family or
matrimonial cases, often observe these hearings.183 The rationale behind this is that it enables the court to make better, more informed
decisions regarding the complexities of domestic violence cases.184
This streamlining of access to information is a key characteristic of
IDV courts.185 This structure provides several benefits to both the
court and victims, which includes efficiency in handling the various
178

Julie A. Helling, Specialized Criminal Domestic Violence Courts, BATTERED WOMEN'S
JUSTICE PROJECT 6 (1999), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/specialized_criminal
_domestic_violence_courts.pdf.
179
Amanda B. Cissner, Melissa Labriola & Michael Rempel, Testing the Effects of New
York's Domestic Violence Courts, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION 29 (2013) [hereinafter Cissner,
Testing Effects].
180
Cissner, Testing Effects, supra note 179.
181
Cissner, Testing Effects, supra note 179, at 28-29.
182
Keri M. Herzog, Suffolk County District Attorney, Speaker at Touro Law Center Assigned Counsel Defender Plan of Suffolk County Seminar (Feb. 16, 2016).
183
Id.
184
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151.
185
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 [2016], Art. 9

730

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 32

cases of the parties.186 Nevertheless, the integration of these cases
and the process of hearing each case in one day in front of one judge
create a potential for a Fifth Amendment violation.
The defendant’s statements during these hearings can be considered testimonial because they reveal the contents of his mind.187
His statements in his criminal case, if used in his civil or matrimonial
case, and vice-versa could be considered incriminating.188 Furthermore, if the defendant is forced to report about his program mandates
or adherence to his orders of protection, these statements would be
considered compelled, thereby violating his privilege against selfincrimination.189 Unfortunately, IDV courts seem to minimize and
overlook this concern despite its seriousness.190 Another area where
a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right might be violated is through
mandated participation in a treatment program.
B.

Treatment Mandate as used in IDV Courts

Requiring a defendant to admit to alleged abusive behaviors
as part of his plea agreement is a potential violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.191 Domestic violence
courts emphasize the need to keep the victims safe and the offenders
accountable for their actions.192 Accountability not only involves acknowledging one’s abusive behavior, but also admitting that one has
indeed been abusive toward his partner.193 This admission could lead
to further consequences for a defendant. However, denials could also
lead to further consequences as the court might see these as noncompliance.194 A mandate to participate in a treatment program, therefore, could be considered falling under penalty cases, thereby raising
a Fifth Amendment violation.195
186
Julie A. Helling, Specialized Criminal Domestic Violence Courts, BATTERED WOMEN'S
JUSTICE PROJECT 10-12 (1999), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/specialized_
criminal_domestic_violence_courts.pdf.
187
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
188
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
189
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
190
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 152.
191
Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 702.
192
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151.
193
VIBS Fam. Violence & Rape Crisis Ctr., Program Manual (2006) (unpublished program curriculum) (no file with the VIBS HALT Program).
194
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153.
195
See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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Batterers Intervention Program

Mandating a defendant to a Batterers Intervention Program196
before a conviction has been rendered unfairly subjects him to the
stigma of being a batterer without a finding of guilt or innocence,
which violates his due process rights, and likely violates his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.197 Treatment mandate is
usually part of the defendant’s bail condition or plea agreement for a
lower sentence.198 The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this type of plea-bargaining, stating:
[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the
state to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the government who
demonstrates by his plea that he is willing to admit his
crime and enter the correctional system in a frame of
mind that affords hope for successful rehabilitation in
a shorted period that might otherwise be necessary.199
Most states believe that the interests in facilitating rehabilitation and
avoiding the expense of a full trial are sufficient to justify encouraging a guilty plea, despite the potential for unfair pressure on the defendant.200
Several appellate courts throughout the United States have
permitted court mandates to treatment programs as well as therapeutic confessions.201 Most courts do not see these as coerced confessions falling under a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.202 Instead, judges, in their discretion, view the
therapeutic confession as a way to hold respondents accountable in
family offense matters.203 Regardless of whether the therapeutic confession would be appropriate in certain domestic violence matters, a
question remains as to whether a defendant’s confession or therapeutic accountability “incriminate[s] him in a pending or later criminal
196
Wolf, Planning DV Court, supra note 63, at 9 (noting that New York does not have a
unified model or guideline for Batterers Intervention Programs).
197
Wolf, Planning DV Court, supra note 63, at 10-11.
198
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153.
199
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 743, 753 (1970).
200
Id.
201
Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 954.
202
Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 954.
203
Berg, Liberty or Silence, supra note 118, at 954.
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prosecution.”204 This then creates another conflict wherein the defendant might construe these programs as punitive instead of rehabilitative.
Interventions for domestic violence offenders begin with a
basic philosophy of eliminating the offender’s abusive behavior towards women.205 The priority of the program at all times is the safety
of women and children.206 In a Batterers Intervention Program, a
psycho-educational group modality is utilized to hold the abuser accountable for past abusive behavior while promoting a responsibility
for change.207 A cornerstone of a Batterers Intervention Program is a
belief that these defendants abuse their victims in order to gain and
maintain power and control over them.208 While participants in the
program may claim that they have benefitted from group participation, this goal is typically secondary to the objective of promoting
safety for women.209
In order to be accepted into a Batterers Intervention Program,
these defendants must agree to three main requirements.210 First, defendants must make a commitment to change.211 Second, to show
this commitment, defendants are expected to demonstrate strict attendance.212 Lastly, defendants must make the commitment to act in
a nonviolent, non-threatening manner prior to beginning the program.213 These defendants are, therefore, expected to admit their
abusive behaviors toward their victims in order to make these com-

204

Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435.
VIBS Fam. Violence & Rape Crisis Ctr., Program Manual (2006) (unpublished program curriculum) (on file with the VIBS HALT Program).
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. The basic tenets of the program are:
1. Batterers are abusive in order to maintain POWER and CONTROL over their partners
2. Battering is a CHOICE
3. Battering is a LEARNED BEHAVIOR
4. Battering is a CRIME
5. Battering is solely the RESPONSIBILITY of the abuser
Id.
209
VIBS Fam. Violence & Rape Crisis Ctr., Program Manual (2006) (unpublished program curriculum) (on file with the VIBS HALT Program).
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
205
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mitments and successfully complete the program.214
Treatment providers are required to submit monthly progress
reports to the various mandating agencies, including IDV courts.215
Unfortunately, offenders often deny the commission of an offense
and the inappropriateness of their actions.216 IDV courts and treatment providers believe that before rehabilitation can take place, an
individual must first admit and acknowledge that he has a problem.217
However, to a defendant, admitting and acknowledging the problem
is an admission of guilt.218 Offenders who fail to acknowledge their
abusive behavior face the risk of restarting the program or being terminated from the program.219 This then blurs the lines between the
punitive and therapeutic purpose of Batterers Intervention Programs.
In People v. Bongiovanni,220 the defendant was charged with
assaulting his wife.221 He was then mandated to attend a domestic
violence program as a condition of his bail.222 The defendant filed a
motion to vacate his bail condition, stating that this was unreasonable.223 The court, in its analysis, stated that it is authorized, by statute, to set a condition of bail when necessary.224 It further reasoned
that domestic violence requires intense judicial attention because of
its complexity and damage to families.225 The court then related program mandates to orders of protection: that they serve the same purpose of imposing punitive restrictions on the defendant.226 Moreover,
they serve as a reminder to the defendant that his freedom can be rescinded should he fail to comply with the mandate.227 As such, the

214
VIBS Fam. Violence & Rape Crisis Ctr., Program Manual (2006) (unpublished program curriculum) (on file with the VIBS HALT Program).
215
Id.
216
Jeffrey A. Klotz, et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to Sex Offenders and Plea Process, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 579,
581-82 (1992).
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
VIBS Fam. Violence & Rape Crisis Ctr., Program Manual (2006) (unpublished program curriculum) (on file with the VIBS HALT Program).
220
701 N.Y.S.2d 613 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
221
Id. at 613.
222
Id. at 613-14.
223
Id. at 613.
224
Id. at 614.
225
Bongiovanni, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
226
Id.
227
Id.
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court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate his bail condition.228
This case illustrates, what seems to be the general view of IDV
courts, that treatment programs are merely tools to punish or further
punish a defendant.229 This emphasizes the concern regarding therapeutic confessions and how they likely violate a defendant’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
2.

Therapeutic Confessions

IDV courts are part of a much larger system of problemsolving courts.230 Problem-solving courts are courts aimed at reducing crime and increasing public safety.231 With increased judicial
oversight through weekly or bi-weekly monitoring, intensive pre- and
post-sentencing case management or supervision, and a general philosophy of therapeutic and restorative justice, the goal of the problem-solving court is to address the core issues underlying criminal
conduct in order to prevent future harm.232
However, unlike other problem-solving courts where rehabilitation is the focus, the purpose of IDV courts is not rehabilitation or
treatment of offenders.233 Judges and prosecutors use program mandates in IDV courts as pre-disposition condition of bail and a way to
closely monitor defendants.234 However, if these mandates are purely
punitive, then the required confession that the defendant makes in order to be admitted into a program can be said to be coerced and in228

Id.
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153. A defendant is warned:
Noncompliance with any of these mandated programs will result in your
bail being increased possibly to an amount that you may not be able to
make. If this were to occur, you will be housed at the Westchester
County Jail awaiting disposition of this case. Noncompliance will result
in your case being advanced on the court calendar. We will not wait until the scheduled court date to address noncompliance. In other words,
noncompliance will be addressed immediately. If you fail to appear, a
warrant will be issued….
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153
230
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151.
231
See generally AMERICAN COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS, Ten Tenets of Fair and Effective Problem-Solving Courts, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_ACCD/ACCD
_TenTenets (last visited May 3, 2016). (enumerating the Ten Tenets of Problem-solving
courts).
232
Id.
233
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151.
234
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151, 153.
229
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criminating.235 Alternatively, a therapeutic confession could fall under the category of penalty cases since defendants who refuse to
comply or choose to remain silent are likely to face consequences for
their noncompliance.236
In State v. Rickert,237 the defendant was arrested and charged
with assaulting and harassing his partner, as well as for violating his
order of protection.238 The defendant pled nolo contendere to all
charges.239 Part of his plea condition was an order of probation and a
mandate to participate and complete a Domestic Abuse Education
Program (DAEP).240
At the defendant’s intake evaluation at DAEP, he denied any
abuse behaviors and all the allegations against him.241 The defendant
also denied particular facts relating to his charges,242 including making verbal threats to kill his victim and intimidating her with a gun.243
He did, however, admit to other abusive behaviors, such as breaking
his own belongings, yelling and screaming at his victim, calling her
names, and displaying inconsistent emotions as a form of power.244
Because of the defendant’s denial and lack of insight, the intake
worker denied the defendant placement in the domestic violence program, stating, “[H]e made himself unavailable to treatment.”245 Upon
receipt of the intake worker’s report, the probation officer filed a
complaint for violation and revocation proceedings.246 The complaint
alleged that the defendant did not take responsibility for his behaviors
associated with these convictions.247 The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation condition as a result.248
235

See supra notes 127, 128 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134, 135 and accompanying text.
237
665 A.2d 887 (Vt. 1995).
238
Id. at 888.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
William A. Nelson, The New Inquisition: State Compulsion of Therapeutic Confessions, 20 VT. L. REV. 951, 958 (1996) (citing Transcript of Violation of Probation Merits
Hearing at 27 (Feb. 7, 1994), Rickert (No. 94-187)).
243
Id.
244
Id. at 958 (citing Transcript of Violation of Probation Merits Hearing at 29-30 (Feb. 7,
1994), Rickert (No. 94-187)).
245
Rickert, 665 A.2d at 888.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
236
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On appeal, the defendant argued that the revocation of his
probation was a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.249 The defendant felt that he was being penalized
for denying facts and behaviors related to his charges to which he
never admitted.250 The court found that the defendant failed to show
how refusal to answer questions created a risk of incrimination.251
Further, the court noted that the defendant was protected “against
double jeopardy, [and] faces no threat of subsequent prosecution.”252
The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s decision.253
This case illustrates the conundrum faced by defendants regarding mandated programs and treatment confession. Should the
defendant choose to stay silent, he would be deemed noncompliant
and would have to face consequences from the court.254 However, if
a defendant agrees with the plea agreement or condition of bail and
“confesses,” he risks incriminating himself in future proceedings,
particularly if he has not been found guilty at the time of his participation in the program.255
V.

SOLUTIONS
A.

Stays in Concurrent Proceedings

The structure of the IDV courts is innovative and efficient.256
It provides a solution to the problem of fragmentation in domestic violence cases.257 However, it also creates a Fifth Amendment violation risk for the defendants.258 This comment proposes that IDV
courts allow for the civil case to be stayed while the criminal case is
pending.
Stays have been used in cases where there were simultaneous
249

Id. at 887, 888.
Rickert, 665 A.2d at 888.
251
Id. at 888-89.
252
Id. at 889.
253
Id.
254
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 153.
255
Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have is a Hammer: Society’s Ineffective Response
to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U.L. REV 919, 995-96 (2011).
256
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151.
257
Id.
258
Julie A. Helling, Specialized Criminal Domestic Violence Courts, BATTERED WOMEN'S
JUSTICE PROJECT 6 (1999), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/specialized_criminal
_domestic_violence_courts.pdf.
250
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proceedings to protect the defendant from having to make a difficult
choice between asserting his Fifth Amendment right or testifying.259
Federal courts have used the following six factors in deciding whether to grant a stay:
(1) The extent to which the issues in the criminal case
overlap with those presented in the civil case; (2) the
status of the [criminal] case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; (3) the private interests of
the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighted
against the prejudice to the plaintiffs caused by the delay; (4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; (5) the interests of the courts; and (6) the
public interest. 260
Although the decision to grant a stay is dependent on the court and its
evaluation of these factors, having this option would decrease the risk
of putting a defendant in a difficult position of choosing between remaining silent and waiving his constitutional privilege.261 As seen in
Havell, this was beneficial in protecting a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.262 Despite this, it has been argued that staying the civil case in a parallel proceeding will cause
significant delays.263 Nevertheless, the unique structure of IDV
courts negates this argument.
IDV courts handle all the cases of one family, including criminal, matrimonial, and family.264 A study has found that it takes
longer to reach a disposition in IDV courts than in traditional
courts.265 In fact, family cases take the longest time to process compared to the matrimonial or criminal cases.266 Since criminal cases in
IDV courts generally reach a disposition quickly, staying the matrimonial and family cases would not result to significant delays in
court. Furthermore, families in IDV courts generally continue to be
259

Michael R. Holt, Parallel Proceedings in Florida’s State and Federal Courts – Fifth
Amendment Considerations, 82 FLA. BAR J. 10 (2008) [hereinafter Holt, Parallel Proceedings].
260
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 99 (2d Cir. 2012).
261
Holt, Parallel Proceedings, supra note 259, at 10.
262
See discussion supra Section IV.A.1.
263
David A. Hyman, When Courts Collide: Procedural Intersection and the Rule of Law,
71 TUL. L. REV. 1389, 1449 (1997).
264
Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 1.
265
Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 36.
266
Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 36.
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involved with the court even after the conclusion of the criminal case
because the defendant is monitored for a period of time postdisposition.267 Therefore, the structure of IDV courts makes it a viable setting in using civil stays.
B.

Therapeutic Immunity

The premise behind problem-solving courts is to attempt to
resolve societal problems by looking at the underlying issues that
cause them.268 Domestic violence is a serious and complicated problem that must be addressed holistically, with the aim of rehabilitating
the defendant.269 Domestic violence is not a victim or a women’s
problem; it is a batterer’s issue.270 This means that in order to resolve
the problem of domestic violence, the focus must be on the batterers.271 IDV courts then must shift their focus and fully embrace being
a problem-solving court, and focus on rehabilitating these defendants.272 However, many, if not most, of these defendants would be
adamant in not complying with treatment mandates or even taking the
therapeutic process seriously if they believe that their statements
might be used against them in a later proceeding.273 Thus, this comment proposes that IDV courts use limited immunity with regard to
therapeutic confessions.
Therapeutic immunity is a way to encourage defendants to
take Batterers Intervention Programs seriously.274 Instead of being
preoccupied with whether their statements would be used against
them, which leads to concealment of important therapeutic information, defendants would be able to focus on working on their abu-

267

Cissner, Suffolk IDV, supra note 22, at 44.
Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Justice and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM
URBAN L. J. 1055, 1060 (2002).
269
Id. at 1057.
270
Jason Katz, Violence Against Women – It’s a Men’s Issue, TED (May 2013),
https://www.ted.com/talks/jackson_katz_violence_against_women_it_s_a_men_s_issue/tran
script?language=en.
271
Id.
272
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151.
273
Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Justice and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM
URBAN L. J. 1055, 1067 (2002).
274
Scott Michael Solkoff, Judicial Use Immunity and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NOVA. L. REV. 1441, 1485 (1993)
[hereinafter Solkoff, Use Immunitiy].
268
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sive behaviors.275 Moreover, it would advance the goals of IDV
courts in maintaining openness among and between the various parties and agencies involved.276 Despite the benefits of therapeutic
immunity, some courts have opposed its use.277
It is argued that granting defendants therapeutic immunity
would interfere with the prosecution of a criminal case.278 However,
immunity does not mean that a defendant can never be prosecuted.279
Giving defendants limited therapeutic immunity only means that
prosecutors would not be able to use the defendant’s statements
against him in a later proceeding.280 The prosecution could still use
independently obtained information against the defendant. Therefore, therapeutic immunity not only protects the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but it also functions
as an effective therapeutic tool in the rehabilitation of these defendants.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Society’s understanding of domestic violence has come a long
way from being a private matter to becoming a public health matter.
The goals of specialized courts, particularly IDV courts, which attempt to tackle the complexity of domestic violence in a holistic
manner, have served victims and society well.281 However, IDV
courts seem to have overlooked the needs of one party in these cases,
the defendants.
Our constitution dictates that the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination is a fundamental right.282 Nonetheless, the
one family-one judge structure of IDV courts creates a situation

275

Keith Guzik, The Agencies of Abuse: Intimate Abusers' Experience of Presumptive Arrest and Prosecution, 42 L. & SOC. REV. 111, 129 (2008) [hereinafter Guzik, Agencies of
Abuse].
276
Angiolillo, IDV Court, supra note 88, at 151.
277
Solkoff, Use Immunity, supra note 274, at 1487-89.
278
Solkoff, Use Immunity, supra note 274, at 1487-89.
279
Solkoff, Use Immunity, supra note 274, at 1490.
280
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 411, 453 (1972) (stating “Transactional immunity, which affords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection that does the
Fifth Amendment privilege”).
281
Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspective, supra note 24, at 20-22.
282
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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where this fundamental right will likely be violated.283 Specifically,
integrating the criminal, family and matrimonial cases in one court
and hearing these cases in one day creates a risk that the defendant’s
privilege against self-incrimination will be violated.284 A defendant’s
statements in these proceedings are testimonial.285 Moreover, because of the heightened judicial oversight, his statements are likely to
be coerced and incriminating.286 To reduce the risk that a defendant’s
statements in his family or matrimonial case will be used against him
in his criminal case, it is suggested that the civil case be stayed until
the resolution of the criminal case.287
Furthermore, therapeutic confessions upon admission and participation in Batterers Intervention Programs likely violate the defendant’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.288 Construing batterers programs as a mere form of another punishment
does not promote the goal of IDV court or problem-solving courts as
a whole.289 It is important that rehabilitation of these defendants becomes a priority in the fight against domestic violence. To achieve
defendant accountability, which is one of the primary goals of IDV
courts,290 it is suggested that IDV courts use limited immunity for
these defendants. In this way, limited immunity lessens the defendants’ concern that their statements during therapy can and may be
used against them in a later proceeding.291 It then allows the defendants to take the program seriously, thereby increasing the chance of
rehabilitation.292 It is important to remember that the constitution affords protection to each and every individual, including domestic batterers, and not just to those deemed deserving by the courts or society.
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See discussion supra Section IV.A.2
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